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Trilemma 
When bioethical discussion touches on the notion of the person it usually takes 
the form of an argument which has a decisive character. Such an understand-
ing often forms a simple syllogism: one should not kill a person; X is a person; 
therefore: one should not kill X with, in the place of X – according to the problem 
considered – terms such as nasciturus, ‘someone terminally ill who has requested 
euthanasia,’  ‘someone who’s life functions are maintained by medical apparatus’ 
are employed. 
On the other hand, one may also encounter such positions as that noted by 
Hugo Engelhardt:
Not all people are equal. (...) Not all people are persons. Not all people are conscious, 
understanding and able to praise or criticise something. A foetus, a newborn, the men-
tally handicapped, those in a deep coma – are examples of people who are nonpersons.1
We should note that Engelhardt does not question the syllogistic scheme above. 
He rejects the validity of one of its premises i.e. that a nasciturus or someone who 
is mentally handicapped is a person. It is not the aim of this paper to establish 
if the conclusions of this syllogism are true or false. We can state, however, that 
they are not justifi ed on the basis of the premises assumed. The reason is not that 
the premises are false but rather that it is unclear what they state. We should be 
aware that closer analysis shows that the notion of the person is not so much de-
cisive as unclear and deceptive. To be exact, in relation to the notion of the person 
we may form the following trilemma:
Either:
 1. The notion of the person is ambiguous;
or 
 2. The notion of the person is arbitrary;
or fi nally:
 3. The notion of the person is redundant.
* Translated by Aeddan Shaw. 
1  H.T. Engelhardt, The foundations of bioethics, Oxford University Press, New York 1996, 
pp. 135–138.
*
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It is easy to see that if the presented alternative is true then the use of the no-
tion of the person in bioethical discussions becomes irrational.
From mask to ontology
The notion of the person (Lat. persona) stems from the word prosopon. This 
term referred to a mask in Greek (and Roman) theatre and its application in phi-
losophy came somewhat later since we cannot fi nd any trace of it in ancient phi-
losophy. It was initially utilised in Roman law but Roman jurists did not equate 
the word persona with the word homo. One man could, from the legal perspec-
tive, be many persons. As it was termed: unus homo sustinet plures personas. It 
functioned thus so that persona identifi ed the legal status of a man, independent 
of their other statutes. Romans could thus be one person as a Roman citizen, an-
other as pater familias, yet others if they performed certain public offi ces. It is not 
diffi cult to see why the word persona was so appealing in this context: for the law, 
a man – depending on the legal context – wore different ‘masks’: as a senator, the 
head of the family, a praetor etc.
It was exactly the legal notion of the person which was utilised in Adversus 
Praxean by Tertullian, a thinker who undoubtedly was aware of the basic notion-
al categories of Roman law. In his exploration of the mystery of the Holy Trinity 
he wrote:
Independent of the close ties between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, we must 
be careful to differentiate those persons. 
Or:
Believers never talk about two Gods or two Lords although they acknowledge that 
each of the persons in the Trinity is God and the Lord.2
This conceptual solution of the problems surrounding the Holy Trintiy was not 
accepted immediately however. It only came about in the 4th century AD during 
a debate on the meaning of the Greek word hipostasis.3 The problem focused on 
in what way it was possible to express the fact that the Holy Trinity was one and 
tripartite at the same time. The unity of the Trinity had been established since 
the Trinity is one substance (ousia, substantia) while the tripartite nature had 
been expressed with the help of the Greek term hipostasis. The problem was that 
hipostasis, like ousia, was expressed with the same Latin word, substantia. In 
order to eliminate misunderstandings, the translation was altered to subsisten-
tia. However, by the 4th century this subtle distinction had fallen into obscurity, 
a direct way to conceptual problems or even heresy. As a result, they reverted 
to Tertullian’s notion of persona: it was formulated as God is one but in three 
personae in documents from the Council of Alexandria in 362 AD.
2  Quoted after www.tertulian.org.
3  Cf. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu.
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However, in the 6th century controversy arose once again. In his work Contra 
Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius introduced his own formulation – and perhaps 
the most famous – of the defi nition of a person: persona est rationalis naturae 
individua substantia, a person is an individual substance of rational nature. He 
explained that this meant we “are related in this manner to what the Greeks 
called υποστασις, hipostasis.” This differentiated between the notion of subsis-
tence (essence) and substance. Subsistentia (essentia), related to the Greek term 
ousia, refers to being which is not impaired (so-called independent existence). In 
turn, substantia (hipostasis) refers to being which may be the basis for impair-
ment (impairment may belong to it). A person (persona) is that substantia which 
is individual and rational. In the conception of Boethius, man is simultaneously 
subsistentia, substantia and persona.
Meanwhile, God is a unifi ed subsistentia but also three substantiae (and thus 
three persons). Boethius highlights, however, that talking about the three divine 
substances has been forbidden by the Church as it leads to certain heresies. What 
is interesting in this consideration is that Boethius ‘inverts’ the traditional trans-
lation of the Greek concepts. Normally ‘ousia’ is identifi ed with ‘substantia’ and 
‘hipostasis’ with ‘subsistentia.’
The notion of the ‘person’ played, perhaps surprisingly, a minor role in 
Scholastic ethics, largely remaining at the service of theology. Józef Bocheński 
noted:
There is no equivalent expression to ‘person’ in Aristotle, in his philosophy. It does not 
feature yet this has not stopped him becoming one of the greatest moralists in history. 
In St Thomas Aquinas, the expression persona often features in dogmatic theology. Yet 
in moral philosophy it appears only once, namely in his article De acceptione persona-
rum. It takes into account man in his personal relation to a candidate, not his value. 
It is the only example in which St Thomas uses the expression ‘person’ in his ethics, 
which does not prevent him being a great moralist.4 
The close connection between the notion of the person and Thomism only 
featured with the 20th-century Personalists. This fact is important for two rea-
sons. Firstly, Personalism, even though it was not an offi cial doctrine of the 
Catholic church, played a role in the thoughts of its representatives which is 
hard to overestimate. As a result, Personalism has become undoubtedly one of 
the most important voices in bioethical discussions. On the other hand, howev-
er, it is important to stress that the marriage of Thomism with the Personalist 
approach is, while at least historically charming, artifi cial. For Boethius, the 
notion of the person had a technical character. Its introduction was indispen-
sible in terms of Boethius great work of trying to unite Greek philosophy with 
Christian faith. It was not meant – and did not – to play a crucial role in ethi-
cal discussions. Such a utilisation of the notion of the person is much later. Put 
plainly, it became a reaction to a different conception of the person which has 
arisen in modern times. 
4  J.M. Bocheński, Między logiką a wiarą (Between Logics and Faith), Noir sur Blanc, 1998, 
p. 130.
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The modern conception of the person
At the forefront of these theories, two undoubtedly stand out: the conceptions 
of Locke and Kant. In Essays Concerning Human Understanding Locke wrote:
we must consider what PERSON stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent 
being, that has reason and refl ection, and can consider itself as itself, the same think-
ing thing, in different times and places.5
Locke formulates in this fragment the psychological conception of a person: the 
crux of personality is the ability to refl ect and, in particular, to refl ect on oneself 
and thus have a feeling of identity in different times and places. This vision is 
fundamentally different from the classical conception of the person. It is impor-
tant to remember that Locke is one of the main philosophers responsible for the 
‘subjective turn’ in philosophy, the appreciation of the subject which Descartes un-
dertook – more or less explicite – with his fundamental ontological division of the 
res cogitans and the res extensa. In other words, in modern philosophy the person 
is not a psychophysical unity – the person is a thinking subject, ego cogitans. Such 
an understanding of the person is opposed by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason:
By this I, or he, or it (the thing), which thinks, nothing is represented beyond a tran-
scendental subject of thoughts = x, which is known only through the thoughts that are 
its predicates, and of which, apart from them, we can never have the slightest concept, 
so that we are really turning round it in a perpetual circle, having already to use its 
representation, before we can form any judgment about it. And this inconvenience is 
really inevitable, because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation, dis-
tinguishing a particular object, but really a form of representation in general, in so far 
as it is to be called knowledge, of which alone I can say that I think something by it.6 
Kant thus feels that the psychological defi nition of a person is inadequate 
since – on the basis of theoretical understanding – we do not and cannot have 
any representation of it. In the Metaphysics of Morals he states that “A person is 
a subject whose actions may be imputed to him. Moral personality is therefore 
nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws (whereas 
psychological personality is usually understood as an ability to be conscious of 
one’s identity in different conditions).”7
In other words, for Kant the person is defi ned by the fact that she is respon-
sible for her own acts. This conception may be termed the ethical theory of the 
person. It is worth emphasizing that it featured in Kant’s metaphysical project. 
As we know, Kant attempted to show that metaphysics – at the level of theo-
retical reasoning – is impossible. He stated that in epistemology, such notions as 
the world, the soul or God could not be equated with any object. Those notions 
played a role of the transcendental ideas whose task is to organise our experience. 
Metaphysics is possible, however, on the grounds of practical cognition and it was 
to this ordering that the Kantian notion of the person belongs. 
5  J. Locke, Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Dent, London 1961, p. 280. 
6  I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 346, internet version.
7  I. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:223, internet version. 
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The above presentation of the three most important conceptions of the person 
– the classical, the psychological and the ethical – shows that attempts to com-
pare these conceptions abstracted from their general metaphysical vision, from 
the very basis on which they were constructed, is a senseless task. One may 
not refer to the classical defi nition of Boethius if we do not simultaneously ac-
cept the metaphysics of Aristotle, which was structured by the ontological prin-
ciples of form, matter, cause and telos. The psychological conception is composed 
of the fundamental separation of mind and body. Finally, the ethical conception 
is groundless for those who ignore the basic Kantian division between theoretical 
and practical reason. In other words, each of these three basic defi nitions of the 
person are accompanied by metaphysical baggage; accepting any of them commits 
us to a certain type of metaphysics. 
The contemporary debate over the person
The 20th-century debate over the notion of the person – broadly speaking – lies 
between two positions. The fi rst may be termed the descriptive and the second, 
the axiological. The descriptive conception of the person stems mainly from ana-
lytical philosophy, directly tied to the tradition of Locke, and defi nes the person 
according to certain empirical criteria (mental criteria). In turn, the axiological 
approach places emphasis on the fact that the person is a bearer of values. In this 
school, the positions are of the classical (mainly Thomist) and – perhaps more 
importantly – the Kantian and neoKantian origins. 
One of the most famous examples of the descriptive theory of the person is that 
proposed by Peter Singer. It defi nes the person as the bearer of certain mental 
attributes: an ability to feel and understand, self-awareness and autonomy, the 
ability to imagine oneself in the future. These characteristics are not fulfi lled by 
all people – e.g. those who are in a coma. On the other hand, such an understand-
ing of personality may be ascribed to some animals (e.g. apes belonging to the 
order of primates).8
A similar position has been expressed, already quoted in this essay, by Hugo 
Engelhardt: 
Not all people are equal. (...) Not all people are persons. Not all people are conscious, 
understanding and able to praise or criticise something. A foetus, a newborn, the men-
tally handicapped, those in a deep coma – are examples of people who are nonpersons.
Advocates of the descriptive conception of the person – at least those who are 
engaged in deliberations of an ethical character – do not limit their deliberations 
to such defi nitions. These defi nitions are used in ethical discourse. The descrip-
tivists claim that a person is someone entitled to certain rights whereas non-
persons are not entitled to such. For example, Singer claims, with the support of 
his conception of the person, that in ethics and law it is necessary to reject the 
8  P. Singer, Animal Liberation, New York Review/Random House, New York 1975.
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dichotomy of ‘human – non-human’ and put in its place a division of ‘person – non-
person’, in which rights are ascribed to persons only.
Singer’s theoretical manoeuvre is typical for advocates of the descriptive con-
ception of the person. A ‘person’ is defi ned by them solely on the basis of de-
scriptive, psychological criteria, but then the defi nition is utilised normatively, 
to decide legal and ethical controversies. Thus, the descriptivist approach suffers 
from serious methodological schisophrenia: the notion of the person is defi ned 
descriptively, but used normatively.
As we can recall, another approach is offered by advocates of the axiological 
conception of the person. In this case, the ethical value of person is ontologically 
prior and defi nes the personhood. In such a consideration, the person is inde-
pendent of contingent mental attributes which stem from, for example, a serious 
impairment, or the stage of personal development (foetus, infant etc.). 
 A particularly interesting example of the axiological conception is the 
Personalist view. Personalism is a surprising melange of Thomist philosophy with 
an emphasised role for the notion of the person and sometimes home to the theses of 
phenomenology or the philosophy of dialogue. The eclecticism of this trend is clear-
ly visible if one considers that within the Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptual 
scheme the notion of person played no role at all. The justifi cation of this claim is to 
be found in the already presented philosophical history of the notion of the ‘person.’ 
One may therefore venture the claim that introducing the notion of the ‘person’ to 
the Thomist conceptual inventory is contrary to the spirit of authentic Thomism. 
Indeed, it is hard to understand who the person should be in this context. We 
should remember that this term was only used with the objective of harmonizing 
Aristotelian metaphysics with the problems (from the point of view of philosophy) 
of the claims of Trinitarian theology. It was of course essential and fully justifi ed 
when used to express the truths of faith in conceptual categories as understood by 
the elite in the twilight of the Ancient period. Amongst the Personalists, however, 
this conceptual stratagem became somewhat broadly applied. 
These few remarks suffi ce, as I believe, to confi rm that the contemporary de-
bate over the notion of the person has developed due to complicated historical con-
ditions and has usually lead to the advocacy of eclectic, methodologically unsound 
and undoubtedly arbitrary conceptions. Bocheński adds:
Where (...) have we taken this notion (of the person) from? It’s main creator was, I think, 
Kant. Later it became more widespread thanks to the work of anti-rationalist philoso-
phers. (...) From this a dubious impression follows. It would be better if we had been 
without it. The category of the person is not needed in philosophical undertakings.9 
The person in law
As we have already mentioned, the notion of the person (persona) in law mani-
fested itself for the fi rst time in Roman law. It was a technical notion which de-
9  J.M. Bocheński, op.cit., p. 130.
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noted a bundle of rights. A human, in accordance with unus homo sustinet plures 
personas, could be ‘many persons.’ We can state that the notion of the person in 
law (the physical person and the legal person) to this day has a technical charac-
ter and is not connected with any concrete philosophical content.
It is easiest to show this by analysing something key to the shaping of con-
temporary law – normative acts. For example, from the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights we can read:
[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.
[D]isregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has 
been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
It is easy to see that in this key declaration, the word ‘person’ never features. 
The only exception occurs in the preamble to the Declaration in which (only in 
the English version) can we read that “[t]he peoples of the United Nations have in 
the Charter reaffi rmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person.” In the offi cial Polish translation, for example, 
the word ‘individual’ is used. 
The term person is used only in a technical sense, in the Universal Declaration 
as well as in other acts of international law. For example, the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950 refers to the 
right of every human to life, claryfying that the deprivation of life will not be 
regarded as contrary to the convention if it occurs as a result of the necessary 
use of force in defending any person from illegal violence. The technical sense of 
person is even utilised in the famous Oviedo ‘bioethical’ convention (convention 
for the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being with regard 
to the application of biology and medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine). The term ‘person’ does not even feature in the title and when it 
does feature in the text then it is in the technical legal understanding such as 
when it refers to the consent that must be given by a person in agreeing to medi-
cal procedures or when protecting a person who is not in a state to express such 
an agreement.
It may also be easily shown that legal regulations do not pressupose any con-
crete philosophical vision of a person. As an example, let us consider a section 
from the Polish Civil Code. This code does not defi ne what is a physical person. 
However, in the fi rst of the articles of Title II, “Osoby [Persons],” in Article 8 c.c., 
it states:
Article 8.§1. Every human, from the moment of their birth, has legal capacity.
Legal capacity – which consist of a certain bundle of rights – is bestowed upon 
every human from the moment of their birth. The capacity to perform legal acts 
is different, as it is limited to people who turned thirteen and have not been in-
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capacitated. It follows that the capacity to perform legal acts does not constitute 
a subset of the rights contained in legal capacity. The Code limits the capacity to 
perform legal acts not only according to age but also in terms of mental illness or 
other kinds of mental disturbance. These circumstances do not, of course, limit 
legal capacity.
An important anthropological pressupposition is contained in the articles re-
lating to the declaration of intent, in particular Article 60 and Article 82 c.c.:
Article 60. (…) the intent of a person to perform legal act may be expressed by all 
actions manifesting that intent in a suffi cient manner (...)
Article 82. The declaration of intent made by a person, who lacks consious or free 
ability to make decisions and express their will, are to be regarded null and void. This 
refers in particular to mental illnesses and other, even lapsed mental disturbances.
We can see that, fi rstly, the use of the notion of the person in both articles 
has a technical (legal) character. It stems from the understanding of the person 
which may be reconstructed with the help of the above cited article of Title II of 
the Code. Secondly, Articles 60 and 82 c.c. presuppose a certain thesis of what 
a human is. In detail, a human being is capable of expressing their will in a free 
and conscious manner. We should be aware, however, that the fact that someone 
is unable to express their will (whether incidentally or permanently), does not 
mean they lose their status as a person (in a legal sense).
One may therefore say that the notion of the ‘physical person’ does not corre-
spond with that outlined in the descriptive notion of the person (in the philosophi-
cal sense). We should bear in mind that in the opinion of authors such as Singer 
or Engelhardt, the person is an individual who possesses the ability to feel and 
understand, is self-aware, has the ability to praise or rebuke someone. In the le-
gal sense, a man who does not fulfi l these criteria remains a person (in the legal 
sense). On the other hand, the provisions of civil law pressupose a certain ‘model’ 
vision of man. Such a ‘model’ is that of an adult and healthy person who has the 
ability to freely and consciously express her will. It is obvious that this is in ac-
cordance with the descriptive understanding of the notion of the person. In other 
words, the civil code contains certain elements of the descriptive conception but 
not as criteria of legal personality.
On the other hand, the meaning of the notion of the ‘physical person’ does not 
correspond to the meaning of the notion of the person in the axiological concep-
tion. We should be aware that it is the civil law that ascribes a bundle of rights 
to a ’physical person;’ the criterion for establishing personality is descriptive, and 
the value is ascribed by the law. In particular, the notion of the ‘physical person’ 
cannot be equated with the notion of the person according to the Personalists. 
The main trend of Personalism rests on Thomist philosophy, in which a key role 
is played by the principle of purpose (telos). As a result, Personalism regards 
a foetus as a person, something which civil law does not.
There do exist, however, legal regulations – such as the already mentioned 
declaration and convention of human rights as well as some constitutions – which 
see a certain ‘original’ value in man (e.g. dignity). We thus have to do with the 
situation in which legal acts pressupose a vision of man which is consistent with 
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some theses of the axiological conception of person. Once again, however, these 
aspects do not constitute a legal defi nition of a person but rather are elements 
which make up the legal vision of man. 
Contra personam
The analysis conducted above, which did not have a normative character (it 
does not formulate any postulates) forms the basis of the growing conviction that 
in legal and bioethical discussions we should not utilise the philosophical notion 
of the person.
One may summarize our fi ndings in the following manner:
(Thesis 1) In law there appears a technical notion of the person which does not 
correspond with any philosophical notion of a person. As a result, the risk of 
equivocation arises and sometimes does when we mix legal and philosophical 
discourse. Law contains, therefore, certain elements of a vision of man: some 
of them belong to the descriptive and others to the axiological account of the 
person.
(Thesis 2) No single, universally accepted philosophical conception of the per-
son exists. In philosophical discussions, competing theories of the person ex-
ist, stemming from fundamentally different presuppositions and often resting 
on historical accidents and misunderstandings.
As a result, the fi rst thesis of the trilemma is justifi ed, i.e. that the notion of 
the person is ambiguous. In terms of legal and bioethical discussion, this ambigu-
ity is reinforced by the fact that law utilises an independent, technical notion of 
the person.
This ambiguity, which undoubtedly rules out the possibility of leading 
a meaningful debate in which a key role is played by the notion of the person, 
may be avoided in two ways: either via an arbitrary choice of one of the existing 
defi nitions of a person or through the rejection of the notion altogether. The fi rst 
solution is very problematic since it forces us to accept some kind of ontology 
(e.g. modifi ed Thomism). It would be hard when such important social questions 
are settled with the support of such a strong presupposition. 
The second solution – rejecting philosophical notion of the person in legal 
and bioethical discussions – seems more justifi ed. As we have highlighted, law 
consists of certain theses which relate to the question of what constitutes man. 
We may therefore postulate that instead of talking about a person, we can talk 
about a human. Our analysis has shown that – at least in relation to the most 
important legal acts – this is the practice. Recognising the notion of the person 
as redundant allows us to escape from both the problem of ambiguity and that of 
arbitrariness. Once again, let us repeat our trilemma:
Either:
 1. The notion of the person is ambiguous;
or:
 2. The notion of the person is arbitrary;
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or fi nally:
 3. The notion of the person is redundant.
It seems that the only sensible solution to this trilemma is to accept the third 
thesis.
The vague human
As a consequence of replacing the notion of the ‘person’ with that of the ‘hu-
man’ in bioethical debate, we have not solved all of the problems. Let us once 
again repeat the syllogism which features in the introduction to this paper, re-
placing the term ‘person’ with that of the ‘human.’
(a) One should not kill humans. 
(b) X is a human.
(c) Therefore: One should not kill X.
At fi rst glance it may seem that we have revived all of the problems which we 
had with ‘person.’ In place X we may once again use other terms (nasciturus, ‘the 
individual whose living functions are supported by medical apparatus,’ etc.) and 
the whole debate reappears. The problem is that we are using natural language 
and names used in this language are usually vague or open textured. 
This is also the case with the notion of the ‘human.’ In the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases there is no doubt that the given ‘object’ may be defi ned by the term 
human. There exists, however, (or potentially may do so) a borderline cases in 
which there is no certainty if we are considering something which may be desig-
nated a human or not. This leads to a serious logical problem. If we reconstruct 
our syllogism in the fi rst order logic then we obtain:
(a) Ha → ~Ka
(b) Ha
(c) ~Ka
where H means “is a human,” a is the name of an individual, while K – “it is al-
lowed to kill.”
If, for example, an individual a is maintained by medical apparatus then one 
could argue that a is a borderline case of the term ‘human.’ From the semantic 
point of view it means that the statement Ha holds the logical value of 1/2 (neither 
true nor false). In such a situation, however, the premises (a) and (b) do not lead 
to the conclusion (c). Modus ponens may only be applied when both premises in 
an argument are true.
Is there a way out of this situation? It seems that this problem stems from the 
way in which the question is posed. We should not try to settle weighty bioethical 
problems – e.g. the acceptability of abortion – by appealing to general (and vague) 
notions such as ‘human.’ The formulation of every bioethical problem should be 
at an appropriate level of precision. It is thus better to ask should we conduct 
abortion and consider the arguments for and against rather than appeal to vague 
theses such as that a foetus is a human. Otherwise it falls into the problems of 
a logical nature. 
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To summarise: we have come to two conclusions. The fi rst states that the 
(philosophical) notion of the person is unnecessary (or even unwelcome) in bio-
ethical discussions. The alternative to rejecting this notion is to accept that it is 
ambiguous or arbitrary.
 The second conclusion leads to the statement that bioethical problems should 
be formulated on an appropriate level of detail. If we formulate it with the help 
of overly general notions we fall into a ’deductive paralysis.’ Deriving conclusions 
from statements which feature vague notions are – in most instances – impos-
sible. It would seem that this is the case with most of those cases which arose 
controversy.
